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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent edition of Psychiatric News, the newspaper of the American
Psychiatric Association, the question was raised whether the term "client" should
replace "patient" in the vocabulary of health professionals.' Proponents of the
change felt "patient" connotes passivity and fosters the illusion that one has
little or no responsibility for one's actions in the therapeutic setting. Opponents
of the change felt that the issue was one of mere semantics, and that in any
event, the term "patient" is so deeply entrenched in how physicians relate to
those who seek help as to make replacing it impractical.
I fully agree the term "patient" is deeply entrenched in how physicians relate
to those who seek help - but I do not think that the issue is merely semantic.
In fact, I shall argue that because the term "patient" is so deeply entrenched,
replacing it is a moral desideratum. My thesis is that the elimination of "pa-
tient" from the medical vocabulary would serve the articulated purpose of in-
formed consent. That purpose is to further decisional authority over one's own
medical fate. By placing the issue within the context of informed consent, I hope
to show how the term "patient" disguises certain value judgments which might
otherwise be apparent to speakers of the language.
*Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Long Island University/C.W. Post Center;
Bioethicist, Queens Hospital Center Affiliation of Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical
Center; B.A., Yeshiva University; M.A., Columbia University; J.D., Pace University
School of Law; Ph.D. Candidate (Philosophy), Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York. I thank my wife, Lina Levit Haber, M.D. and my
colleagues at Post, Joshua Halberstam and Natika Newton, not all of whom concurred
with the contents of the article.
I Talbot, Patients or Clients - What's in a Name?, Psychiatric News, July 20, 1984,
at 2, col. 1-3. But see Patient or Client, Psychiatric News, Sept. 21, 1984, at 2, col. 2-4.
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In Part II of this article, I develop the "patient"/agent distinction from the
vantage point of humanistic ethics. This is the view that the knowledge of man
is the basis for establishing norms and values. In Part III, I argue that the "pa-
tient"/agent distinction correlates with the Kantian notions of heteronomy/
autonomy, and disrespect for autonomy/respect for autonomy. In Part IV, I
show that the "patient"/agent distinction also correlates with the standards of
disclosure the courts have adopted in deciding informed consent cases. Finally,
in Part V, I show how the family of notions associated with "patient," although
deeply entrenched in the medical profession, fails to do justice to those values
which informed consent is designed to further, and in Part VI, I give my reasons
why the term should be replaced.
First I must explain what I mean by informed consent. Informed consent refers
to the duty of a physician, before treating a "patient," to explain the procedure
to the "patient" and to warn him of any material risks or dangers inherent in
or collateral to the procedure, so as to enable that "patient" to make an in-
telligent and informed choice about whether to undergo treatment. This defini-
tion is uncontroversial. Nevertheless, as Jay Katz points out, the doctrine of
informed consent is both "confusing and confused. "2 Therefore, I will attempt
to clarify my proferred definition.
First, I have defined informed consent as a duty of the physician to provide
relevant information. I might equally have defined it as the right of the "pa-
tient" to receive this information. In this respect, the duty and the right are
correlative, a point to which I shall later return. 3 For now, it should be observ-
ed that informed consent is a two-step process: the physician discloses, and the
"patient" consents. The disclosure requirement ordinarily obligates physicians
to reveal the diagnosis, the nature of the contemplated treatment, the risks in-
herent in such treatment, the prognosis if the proposed treatment is not under-
taken, and the alternative modalities of treatment, if any. 4 The consent require-
ment presumes "patients" to be competent, intelligent, and to be consenting
to treatment voluntarily.5 This, at least, is the paradigm model and I am assum-
ing it without further qualification. 6
Second, I have spoken of "material risks and dangers" inherent in or collateral
to the treatment. There is some confusion as to the amount of information a
physician must disclose. It has been suggested that since the physician/"patient"
2 Katz, Informed Consent - A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PiTT. L. REV. 139
(1977).
3 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
4 Miller, Informed Consent (pt. 2) 244 J. A.M.A. 2,100 at 2,101 (1980).
' See Meisel & Roth, What We Do and Do Not Know About Informed Consent,
246 J. A.M.A. 2,473 (1981).
6 There are, of course, many interesting, albeit difficult, issues inherent in any defini-
tion of informed consent. Some are: how do we assess competency and understanding?;
how do we apply the doctrine to in-patients vs. out-patients, or to the chronically ill
vs. the critically ill? How compatible is the so-called "therapeutic privilege" with in-
formed consent? For purposes of this Article, none of these issues needs to be discussed.
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relationship is a fiduciary one, the "patient" is entitled to full disclosure. 7 This
has rarely been accepted in the case law;" in any event the better view is that
"material" means the probability of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm.9
For instance, when a "patient" undergoes a myelogram, the probability of
developing foot drop is so remote as to be statistically insignificant; because
foot drop is not a critical illness, the physician need not disclose the possibility
of it occurring."0
Finally, I have assumed a situation in which the proposed treatment is
specifically and exclusively directed to the benefit of the "patient." There are,
however, other applications of informed consent. The doctrine applies to a
therapeutic situation in which the proposed treatment exclusively benefits
another (e.g., the living kidney donor); to a purely experimental situation in
which the objective of the procedure is entirely unrelated to the welfare of the
individual but may prove beneficial to "patients" generally, or add to the com-
mon fund of medical knowledge (e.g., to what we already know about the
transmission of hepatitis); and to a hybrid situation in which treatment of
unknown efficacy is administered both for the possible benefit of the "patient"
and for the potential increase in medical knowledge (e.g., new chemotherapeutic
agents for the treatment of carcinoma)." Much of what I say applies, pari passu,
to each of these situations."
7 See, e.g., Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 860 (Wash. App. 1974), aff'd per curiam,
530 P.2d 334 (Wash. App. 1974); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1101-02 (Kan. 1960);
Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (N.M. 1962). A "fiduciary relation" arises whenever
confidence is reposed on one side, and domination and influence exist on the other; the
relation can be legal, social, domestic, or merely personal. In re Heilman's Estate, 37
Ill. App. 3d 390, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1976).
In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957), Justice
Bray wrote that "[1In discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed con-
sent." According to Jay Katz, "[tihis was a startling piece of work. Going in two op-
posite directions-discretion and full disclosure-his answer went nowhere." J. KATZ,
THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT, 61 (1984).
' See Miller, supra note 4, at 2347 ("It is generally recognized that a physician may
not be required to disclose a risk if there is an extremely small probability of its occur-
rence or if it threatens only minor harm."). See also Brahams, Informed Consent Does
Not Demand Full Disclosure, 2 THE LANCET 58 (1983).
1 See, e.g., Holland v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 270 Or. 129, 137-138, 522 P.2d 208,
212 (1974) ("If a serious injury might occur from a given method of treatment, the physi-
cian must inform the patient of all but extremely remote risks. However, if the potential
injury is slight, then the patient need be informed only of those risks which might well
occur.").
1o Contra Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 797, 82 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1970) (failure
to disclose possibility of developing foot drop from myelogram held to violate duty of
disclosure).
" Laforet, The Fiction of Informed Consent, 235 J. A.M.A. 1,579 (1976).
" It should be observed, however, that while I am specifically interested in autonomy
as the moral foundation of informed consent, there are other foundations which have
been invoked as well. Veatch has mentioned three and possibly four bases for informed
consent: 1) the maximization of good to the patient and the minimization of harm to the
1985-861
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II. THE "PATIENT" AND THE AGENT
"Patient," from the Latin pati meaning "to suffer," implies passivity. "Agent,"
from the Latin agere meaning "to act," implies activity. These two cognates,
activity and passivity, have meanings today different from those they had in
classical antiquity through the Middle Ages and up until the beginning of the
Renaissance. 13
In modem usage, activity refers to the expenditure of energy. Thus, farmers
who cultivate land are called active, and so are workers on an assembly line,
salespeople who persuade customers to buy their wares, etc. Activity refers to
overt behavior and not to the person behind the behavior. It does not differen-
tiate between activity and business in the sense of being busy. 14
Even so, there is an important distinction between activity and business. This
distinction correlates with the terms "alienated" and "non-alienated" with respect
to activities. In alienated activity, I do not experience myself as the acting sub-
ject of my activity. Rather, I experience the outcome of my activity as something
separated from me, as standing over and against me. In alienated activity, I
do not really act; I am acted upon by external or internal forces (I am passive).
In non-alienated activity, however, I am the author of my thoughts and ac-
tions; each of these I experience as my own.15 It follows that alienated activity,
in the sense of business, is in essence passivity; and passivity, in the sense of
non-business, may in essence be activity. 6
Historically, philosophers such as Aristotle did not distinguish between ac-
tivity and business. For Aristotle, alienated work was performed largely by slaves
and was excluded from praxis, a term denoting the kinds of activities only free
persons performed. 17 The highest form of praxis, i.e., non-alienated activity,
was the contemplative life. He considered the contemplative life the activity
of nous and eudaimonia (well-being): "an activity of the soul in accordance with
virtue."18
patient; 2) the individual's right to self-determination (autonomy); 3) the maximization
of good to society (utilitarianism); and possibly 4) the interests of the physician. The
utilitarian basis might be consistent with our intuitions about the purely experimental
situation. Veatch, Three Theories of Informed Consent: Philosophical Foundations and
Policy Implications (app. II), in THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH 26-1 (1978) (DHEW Pub. No. (OS)
78-0014) (prepared for the N'tl Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomed. & Behav. Research) (hereinafter cited at THE BELMONT REPORT).
13 E. FROMM, To HAVE OR To BE, 61 (1982).
14 Id. at 78.
1I Id. at 78-79. See also L. CROCKER, POSITIVE LIBERTY 36-43 (1980) (distinguishing
autonomous behavior, "things which I can do," from non-autonomous behavior, "things
which happen to me." Id. at 36).
16 E. FROMM, supra note 13, at 79.
17 See N. LOBKOWICz, THEORY AND PRACTICE: HISTORY OF A CONCEPT FROM ARISTOTLE
TO MARX, 9-15 (1967).
18 ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, 1177a (J.A.K. Thomson trans. 1981). Aristotle
uses the term "soul" since on his view, eudaimonia for a rational being must involve
more than bodily pleasure. Ingredients fitting to his cognitive faculties must also be
[Vol. 1:43
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Spinoza, too, regarded activity as intimately connected with reason. To the
extent that we act in accordance with the conditions of our existence (our con-
atus), we are aware of these conditions as real and necessary, i.e., we know
the truth about ourselves. Thus, "[olur mind is in certain cases active, and in
certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active,
and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive." 19
Spinoza also distinguished between activity and passivity (to act and to suf-
fer) as referring to the two fundamental aspects of the mind's operation.
I say we act when anything takes place, either within us or externally
to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is, . . . when through
our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which
can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On
the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when
that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature ex-
ternally, we being only the partial cause.2"
In sum, in the philosophical tradition of pre-industrial society the distinction
between being active and being passive was the distinction between being and
not being the author of one's own thoughts. In contrast, the modem distinc-
tion is between one who is busy and one who is idle. This should not surprise
us, since the alienation of labor had not yet reached proportions comparable
to that existing now.21 By and large, activity today means socially recognized
behavior that results in corresponding socially useful changes. 22 It is for this
included. And with respect to the contemplative life, Aristotle clearly thinks of con-
templation as a consciously directed activity.
'9 SPINOZA, THE ETHICS, 130 (R.H.M. Elwes trans. 1951).
20 Id. at 129.
21 E. FROMM, supra note 13, at 80. This view is not unique to Fromm. Marx gave
it its most notorious expression and Albert Schweitzer, in many of his writings, saw
modem man as unfree, incomplete, unconcentrated, and "absolutely passive." See general-
ly A. SCHWEITZER, DIE SCHULD DER PHILOSOPHIE AN DEM NIEDERDANG DER KULTER 1923);
VERFALL UND WIEDERAUFBAU DER KULTER (1923); CIVILIZATION AND ETHICS (rev. ed. reprint
of 1923 ed., 1973).
Willard Gaylin recently made an analogous point about human dignity: "For the most
part, human dignity was not redefined until modem times. However, the Reformation
did produce one important if subtle change. The concept of dignity was gradually ex-
tended to encompass not just the species, but each individual member of the species."
Gaylin, In Defense of the Dignity of Being Human, Hastings Ctr. Rep., Aug. 1984, at
18. Gaylin also quotes Axel Stern as saying:
The problem of human dignity, not in the sense of that of human beings ver-
sus that of other animals, but in the sense of the dignity of each human being
as a person, has come to the fore with the rise of mercantilism and capitalism
and an increasing individual self-awareness. A very clear manifestation of it
can be found in the assertion of the protestant reformers that each Christian
has to face his God directly and without mediation.
Id. citing Stem, On Value and Human Dignity, LISTENING, Spring 1975, at 78.
22 E. FROMM, supra note 13, at 78.
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reason that philosophers, for instance, have typically been viewed as not being
very active in contrast, for example, to attorneys or laborers.23 It is unlikely
this view would have occurred to Aristotle or Spinoza.
III. HETERONOMY AND THE AUTONOMOUS AGENT
If we attend to the philosophical origins of "activity" and "passivity," it is
clear that activity refers to the person behind the behavior, i.e., to the agent,
and not merely to the behavior itself. The same holds true of passivity; it ap-
plies to the person, i.e., "patient," and not merely to his behavior. What follows
from this is that it is etymologically wrong to attribute actions to "patients;"
only agents can act, in the best sense of the term.
To give informed consent is to perform an action of some sort. It is an affirm-
ative action whereby the one being treated determines for herself her own best
interests (medically as well as psychologically, socially, and financially),2 4 ac-
cording to what the competing risks and benefits are, 25 and so on. Although
the one being treated makes this determination in consultation with the physi-
cian, the one being treated and not the physician ultimately decides her own
medical fate.
The moral basis of informed consent is generally thought to be the concept
of autonomy. Our understanding of this concept was shaped by Kant's Fun-
damental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.2 6 Autonomy, said Kant, means
23 Typically viewed, that is, by laymen and some non-philosophers. Of course, it
is entirely possible for a philosopher to be passive in the relevant sense and for a laborer
to be active. The neurotic behavior of intellectualizing one's thoughts, frequently found
in clinical narcissists, is an instance of passive philosophizing. See, e.g., the discussion
of Tolstoy's character Levin in A. ROTHSTEIN, THE NARCISSISTIC PURSUIT OF PERFECTION,
121-55 (1980).
24 The doctrine of informed consent, in addition to furthering the autonomy of in-
dividuals, also furthers an objective of tort law. To the extent that tort law seeks to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources, it aspires to place the responsibility for par-
ticular decisons upon those best able to avoid the costs arising from those decisions.
Thus, while the physician can best determine a "patient's" medical needs, the "patient"
can best determine her non-medical needs. The cost to the physician of discovering the
"patient's" psychological, social, and business needs is simply too great. Only the "pa-
tient" sufficiently knows her own value preferences so as to determine the desirability
of a particular course of treatment. See Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient,
83 YALE L. J., 1632 at 1645-46 (1974), citing G. CALABRASI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1969).
25 See Superintendent v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.Ild 417 (Mass. 1977), which held that
the general right to refuse medical treatment exists in the incompetent as well as the
competent patient. Saikewicz, a mentally retarded resident of a Massachusetts state in-
stitution, suffered from acute and incurable leukemia. A guardian ad litem, appointed
by the probate court after petition by the institution, recommended that chemotherapy
not be administered to Saikewicz. On balance, the guardian ad litem concluded that
the patient's inability to understand the treatment, and the fear and pain he would undergo
outweighed the limited benefits of treatment. The court found that since the value of
human dignity extends to both the competent and the incompetent, id. at 427, the same
choice concerning treatment vel non exists. It is not "the unvarying responsibility of
the State to order medical treatment in all circumstances involving the care of an in-
competent person." Id.
26 (T. Abbott trans. 1949).
[Vol. 1:43
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governing oneself, including making choices in accordance with moral prin-
ciples which are one's own and which are universalizable. Hence, his first for-
mulation of the categorical imperative is: "Act only on that maxim whereby
thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law.."2
7
Kant also shaped our understanding of what it means to respect an
autonomous person. Kant said that to respect an autonomous person is to take
seriously 28 a person's considered value judgments even when it is believed such
judgments are mistaken. Hence, his second formulation of the categorical im-
perative is: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in
that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only. '" 29
It is important to realize that Kant distinguished autonomy and respect for
autonomy from heteronomy and disrespect for autonomy. Under heteronomy,
Kant included both external and internal determinations of the will, but not
in-dwelling moral principles. Thus, one is heteronomous when one acts from
desire, impulse, habit, or in short from any motive other than respect for one's
own moral principles which are universalizable.
Similiarly, to show disrespect for an autonomous person is either to reject
that person's considered value judgments or to deny him the freedom to act
on those judgments. This, for Kant, is what it means to treat a person as a means
to an end; it always involves a violation of autonomy. To treat any person
in accordance with principles not of his own making shows a lack of respect. 30
It is no coincidence that Kant, as well as subsequent moral philosophers, con-
sidered autonomy a property of moral agents. To be a moral agent, one must
be free and responsible, with a certain amount of maturity and rationality. One
who is busy but who lacks these qualities (an infant, an acute psychotic), is
not considered a moral agent (is not autonomous) and we do not ascribe to
him moral qualities (show respect for his autonomy) and treat him accordingly.
The notions of autonomy and heteronomy, of respect for autonomy and
disrespect for autonomy, correlate with the terms "agent" and "patient." While
Kant had no term for one who is heteronomous and one whose autonomy is
not respected, the term "patient" would certainly suffice. We might say, in the
Kantian spirit, that a "patient" is one whose considered value judgments are
not his own but which come from without (it makes no sense to speak of "moral
patients" if morality requires autonomous agents). Similarly, not to respect an
autonomous person is to view that person merely as a "patient," i.e., as one
whose judgments about what is of value to himself are not taken seriously.
27 Id. at 38.
28 1 have borrowed this phrase from Ronald Dworkin: See R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
29 E. KANT, supra note 26, at 46.
30 For an excellent discussion of autonomy in medical ethics, see T. Br~ucHAmP &
J. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics, 56-85 (1979).
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IV. Two STANDARDS OF DIscLosuRE
The distinction between agent and "patient" occurs in law as in morality.
I have previously alluded to the standards of disclosure governing the amount
of information a physician must reveal. There are two relevant legal standards:
the professional custom standard, which is a "patient"-oriented standard, and
the material risk standard, which is an agent-oriented standard. 3 1
The professional custom standard requires a physician to disclose only such
information as is customarily disclosed by physicians similarly situated in the
medical community. 32 This standard is based on the proposition that the scope
of a physician's duty of disclosure is determined by the standards of the medical
profession. From this perspective, it is the physician who determines the balance
of treatment harm over benefits and who establishes the topics to be discussed
and the amount and kinds of information to be disclosed about each topic. 33
A good illustration of this approach is DiFilippo v. Preston.34 The "patient"
in DiFilippo had suffered injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves and paralysis
of the vocal chords following a thyroidectomy. The physician had not disclos-
ed the risk of such injury to the "patient." The evidence, however, showed "that
it was not the practice of surgeons in the Wilmington area to warn patients
of the possibility" 35 of such injury. Therefore, the "patient" was unable to recover
on a lack-of-informed-consent theory.36
The mateiral risk standard requires a physician to disclose all information
an individual needs to make an informed decision about whether to undergo
treatment. 37 This standard is based on the principle of self-determination
(autonomy) originally articulated by Judge, later Justice, Cardozo in Schloen-
dorf v. Society of New York Hospital: "[E]very human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done to his body."'3 1
From this perspective, the relevance of a piece of information is measured not
31 These are not the only standards of disclosure-only the most ubiquitous. For
another standard, see T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, MEDICAL ETHICS: THE MORAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF PHYSICIANS, 67-70 (1984). See also N.Y. Sct. 28, § 2805-d.1 (McKin-
ney 1975) Health Law § 2805-d.1 which is a hybrid of these two standards.
32 See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Preston, 53 Del, 539, 173 A.2d 333, 339 (1961) discussed
infra note 34 and accompanying text; Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. 1967);
Natanson V. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960); Mudd v. Dorr, 40 Colo. App.
74, 574 P.2d 97, 101 (1977).
33 See T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 31, at 68.
34 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (1961).
35 Id. at 336.
36 Id. at 339.
37 See, e.g., Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971); Cooper v.
Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899,
484 P.2d 1162 (1971), aff'd, 81 Wash. 2d 465, 502 P.2d 1194 (1972). These were the
first cases to adopt this standard. The major impetus came in 1972 with Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d
1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972). Cobbs is discussed infra note 40 and accompanying text.
38 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thung,
2 N.Y. 2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
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by a professional judgment, but by the significance a reasonable person would
attach to a risk in arriving at a decision. In theory, therefore, a physician may
be found liable for negligent failure to disclose even if her behavior conforms
to recognized and routine professional practice. 39
Cobbs v. Grant well illustrates this approach.4 0 The "patient" in Cobbs had
undergone surgery to cure a peptic duodenal ulcer. Subsequently, he began to
bleed internally from a severed artery at the hilum of his spleen. This complica-
tion occurs in approximately five percent of such operations. Because of the
seriousness of the bleeding, the "patient" had to undergo a second operation
for removal of his spleen. 4 1 Later, it was discovered that Cobbs was develop-
ing a new ulcer, another risk inherent in an operation to remove a peptic ulcer.
After four months of attempting to treat this ulcer with a restricted diet and
antacids, the physician performed a third operation, a gastrectomy, with
removal of fifty percent of the "patient's" stomach.42 After this operation, the
"patient" was rehospitalized because of internal bleeding owing to the premature
absorption of a suture.
Before the first operation, Cobbs' personal physician had advised him of the
risks involved in undergoing general anesthesia, and the surgeon had explain-
ed the nature of the operation. Neither physician had disclosed the risk of in-
jury to the spleen, the possibility of developing a new ulcer, or the potential
for premature absorbtion of a suture.43
The "patient" brought suit against the surgeon for negligence in performing
the operation and failing to obtain his informed consent to the procedure. The
jury returned a general verdict for the "patient," but on appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a verdict
based on lack of informed consent. Since it was unable to determine on which
ground the jury had relied, the court reversed judgment and ordered a new trial
on the informed consent issue. 44
The Cobbs court rejected the professional custom standard in favor of the
material risk standard. First, it expressed doubts as to whether a discernable
professional standard regarding disclosure actually exists; the court feared that
to rely on a vague or nonexistent professional standard would vest physicians
with virtually absolute discretion as to what information to deliver. 45 Second,
and more important, it reasoned that a standard requiring disclosure of all in-
formation material to the "patient's" decision is more consistent with the "pa-
tient's" right of autonomy than is a standard that allows information to be
withheld on the basis of medical custom. 46 Furthermore, the court opined that
31 This was the basis for liability in Natanson v. Kline, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670
(1960).
40 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972).
I4 d. at 235, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
42 Id., 502 P.2d at 5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
43 Id.
44 Id. 234, 502 P.2d at 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
45 Id. at 243, 502 P.2d at 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 514.
46 Id.
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the decision about which risks are relevant to the "patient's" own decision to
undergo treatment is not one that brings the physician's medical knowledge and
skill peculiarly into play 47 and that there is, therefore, no reason to judge by
a medical standard the doctor's decision not to disclose. 48
V. THE PHYSICIAN'S VIEW: THE HETERONOMOUS "PATIENT"
The previous sections have described the total connotations of agent and "pa-
tient" as demonstrated by the family of notions surrounding these terms. "Agent"
correlates with non-alienated activity, autonomy, respect for autonomy, and
the material risk standard, while "patient" correlates with alienated activity
(passivity), heteronomy, disrespect for autonomy, and the professional custom
standard. This can be represented schematically as follows:
AGENT PATIENT
Moral Agent
Autonomy Heteronomy
Respect for Autonomy Disrespect for Autonomy
Non-alienated Activity Alienated Activity (Passivity-)
Material Risk Standard Professional Custom Standard
These are what the terms connote (or should connote) when employed in the
relevant senses.
Clearly, if the person being treated is an autonomous moral agent, he has
the right to his own considered value judgments providing such judgments are
not detrimental to others. Conversely, if the person being treated is not an
autonomous moral agent, such rights and duties may not arise. 49 Thus, the way
in which physicians relate to those who seek help is paramount in determining
their duties and obligations. In this section, I shall argue that physicians have
typically viewed their "patients" as something other than moral agents, and
in the following section I shall suggest that calling people "patients" shows a
disrespect for their autonomy, and ought to be replaced by a more suitable term.
As medical ethics has developed over the past 2,500 years, the family of con-
cepts associated with "agent" has been conspicuously absent. The Hippocratic
Oath, for instance, does not oblige the physician to obtain consent before treat-
ment. Rather, Decorum XVI of the Hippocratic Corpus suggests that physicians
would be wise to conceal most things from their "patients," since when given
information "many patients ...have taken a turn for the worse."50
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. I am assuming that a "patient's" right
to be respected as an autonomous agent entails the correlative duty of the physicians
to respect that right. Of course, not all rights entail correlative duties. The list of human
rights such as the one proclaimed by the United Nations may not oblige governments
to provide for these rights. See BIOMEDICAL ETHics, 10-11 (T. Mappes & J. Zembaty eds.).
50 See Cross & Churchill, Ethical & Cultural Dimensions of Informed Consent, 96
ANNALS 110 (1982).
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The Hippocratic Oath lays down only one comprehensive responsibility -
to promote health and abstain from doing harm. Thus: "I will apply dietetic
measures to the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will
keep them from harm and injustice." 51 Strictly construed, this obligation binds
the physician to treat his "patients" for their benefit, but according to what he,
not they, perceive that benefit to be, and to what he, not they, think will most
promote it. - Hippocrates further admonished physicians to
[plerform (these duties) calmly and adroitly, conceiling most things from
the patient while you are attending to him. Give necessary orders with
cheerfulness and serenity, turning his attention away from what is be-
ing done to him; sometimes reprove sharply and emphatically, and
sometimes comfort him with solicitude and attention, revealing nothing
of the patient's future or present condition. 53
Nowhere in his writings does Hippocrates suggest that the physician actively
engage the "patient" in dialogue so as to effectuate his autonomy rights. What
Beauchamp and McCullough have called the principle of beneficence- 4 directly
conflicts with our notions of autonomy.
It is clear, then, that at least in the earliest manifestation of Western medical
ethics, physicians viewed those who sought help as "patients," with all that this
implies. As Katz points out, in a recent work, physicians held the same view
during the Medieval period, through the age of Enlightenment, and up to and
including the twentieth century.55 They have perceived themselves as commit-
ted to the welfare of "patients," and anything that impedes the promotion of
their welfare is viewed as a denial of their professional responsibility. That many
physicians still feel this way is evidenced by more modem authorities on medical
ethics56 and the fact that the Hippocratic Oath is still taken by graduating physi-
cians throughout the United States despite the strictures against it.57
It hardly needs stating that health is a value that we all desire and it is cer-
tainly admirable that physicians promote it. Nevertheless, the prinicple of
beneficence to which physicians appeal clashes with our strong intuitions about
being autonomous and being respected as autonomous agents. For instance,
consider the following exchange which took place between a physician and
11 Edelstein, The Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation and Interpretation, in BULLETIN
OF MEDICINE (supp.) 3 (1943).
52 Donagan, Informed Consent in Therapy and Experimentation, 2 J. MED. & PHIL.
(1977) reprinted in ETics AND PUBLIC POLICY 348 (T. Beauchamp & T. Pinkard eds. 1983).
13 2 HIPPOCRATES, DECORUM 297-99 (W. Jones trans. 1967).
14 T. Beauchamp & L. McCullough, supra note 31, at 28.
" See J. KATZ, supra note 7, at 7-29.
56 See, e.g., J. GREGORY, LECTURES ON THE DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS OF A PHYSI-
CIAN (London 1772). See also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS, 951-75 (1978); Amundson
& Ferngren, Philanthropy in Medicine: Some Historical Perspectives, in BENEFICENCE
AND HEALTH CARE, 1-32 (E. Shelp ed. 1981).
11 See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 31, at 29.
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plaintiff's attorney in the 1961 case of Moore v. Webb.58 Moore is a poignant
example of how physicians underevaluate their "patient's" autonomy.
Moore had consulted an oral surgeon about a toothache. She was told that
extractions would be necessary and gave her consent, at the same time indicating
that she did not think all her teeth needed to be removed.5 9 After an X-ray ex-
amination, the surgeon unilaterally decided that a complete extraction would
be beneficial and proceeded to extract all of the "patient's" teeth. 60 The "pa-
tient" brought suit on the grounds that her teeth were extracted without her
informed consent. At the trial the following transpired:
PHYSICIAN: . . . I think you should strive to do for the patient what is
the best thing over a long period of time for the patient. We tried to abide
by that.
ATTORNEY: Isn't that up to the patient?
PHYSICIAN: No, I don't think it should be. If they go to a doctor they should
discuss it. He should decide . . .
ATTORNEY: Isn't that up to the patient7 . . . If I want to keep these teeth,
can't I do it?
PHYSICIAN: You don't know whether they are causing you trouble.
ATTORNEY: That's up to me, isn't it?
PHYSICIAN: Not if you come to see .me it wouldn't be. 61
This virtually parodizes the idea of the physician/"patient" relationship and
its basis in informed consent to treatment. Why is this a parody7 Why do we
find the attitude of the physician abhorrent? The answer is that the physician
in this case treated the plaintiff as a "patient," i.e., as one who is not an
autonomous agent and has no right to be respected as such. Szasz and Hollander
have described this type of physician/"patient" interaction as the "activity-
passivity" model.62 The behavior characterized by this "oldest conceptual
model " 63 is "based on the effect of one person on another in such a way and
in such circumstances that the person acted upon is unable to contribute actively,
or is considered inanimate." 64 According to the model, the "patient" resembles
a helpless infant, and the physician an active parent.
That the "activity-passivity" model persists is demonstrated by a recent survey
for the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine
and Biomedical and Behavior Research. Many physicians (fifty-five percent of
58 345 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1961).
59 Id. at 241.
60 Id.
61 J. KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 649 (1972).
62 Szasz & Hollander, A Contribution to the Philosophy of Medicine-The Basic
Models of the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 97 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 585-87 (1956).
63 Id. at 586.
64 Id.
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those polled) think the primary purpose of informed consent is to avoid law-
suits. 65 In another survey conducted by a research team from the University
of Pittsburgh, similar findings were made:
Most of the physicians we observed did not view informed consent as
an integral part of good patient care. Although they generally supported
the idea of giving patients more information, few physicians gave it
much attention. Most physicians who were interested in informed con-
sent seemed primarily concerned with it as a legal problem. Indicative
of this attitude was a senior member of the house staff who, when ask-
ed how the presence of observers had changed the service, said that
he was more inclined to discuss the patients' treatment with them on
rounds when he knew the observers would be there. Ordinarily, he
said, he would often discuss patients' treatment with them privately
because "[tihe intern(s) think it's real boring to stand there and listen
to me tell somebody about what their treatment is going to be." Even
at this early stage of their careers, the interns found the dialogue with
the patient uninteresting. 66
Similarly, the results of a study by Christie and Merton found that "the medical
student's image of the Ideal Physician was one of high extroversion, slight emo-
tionality, thorough dominance, and a handsome appearance .. .[while] ...
the patient was envisioned as introverted, emotional, weakwilled, and ugly." 67
VI. PURGING THE MEDICAL VOCABULARY
We see then that "patient" and all this term implies is in fact deeply entren-
ched in how physicians relate to those who seek help. As in Moore v. Webb,
physicians continue to view "patients" as passive recipients of their knowledge
and expertise, as the beneficiaries of their clinical judgments.
Part of the persistence of the physician's attitude may be due to the fact that
the term "patient" straddles two distinct notions. On the one hand, the term
"patient" refers to someone who undergoes some action, who is acted upon.
This is the sense contrary to "agent" implying freedom, competence and power
to act. On the other hand, the term "patient" refers to someone who suffers
or who is in need of medical help. The two notions may interact in the sense
that the more we become "patients" in the latter sense, the more we become
"patients" in the former.6s But there is no necessary connection between the
65 See, President's Ethics Commission, Medical World News, Nov. 22, 1982 at 7.
66 Lidz, Barriers to Informed Consent, 99 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 541 (1983).
67 Christie & Merton, Procedures for the Sociological Study of the Value Climate
of Medical Schools, 33 J. MED. ED. 247-56 (1958).
68 See Bok, Round Table Discussion, in 3 PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS-ITs
NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 230-31 (S. Spicker & T. Englehardt eds. 1977).
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two notions. 6 9 It is both conceptually and factually possible to be an autonomous
agent requiring medical attention. Once the term is dissected in this way, the
weakness of such a medical attitude becomes apparent. Physicians have failed
to separate these two distinct notions.
All of this is changing, however. "Patients" have become acutely aware of
their long-ignored autonomy rights. Such awareness is fueled by the media,
which are publicizing the ethical dimensions of health care, as well as the pro-
liferation of medical malpractice actions. In the literature, too, there is
widespread concern with improving the physician/"patient" relationship by
engaging the "patient" in active dialogue.7 0 As Alan Stone asserts:
[Liet there be no mistake: there is a growing demand to transform the
doctor-patient relationship ... [tihe traditional doctor-patient relation-
ship is seen. .. as one in which the doctor and the patient are unequal
bargaining partners in a contract for services. It is the doctor's special
knowledge that creates the advantage.
Informed consent is meant, then, to force the doctor to give the pa-
tient knowledge that will make him or her an equal bargaining part-
ner. Thus informed consent is meant to transform the essence of the
doctor-patient relationship from status to contract. 71
Thus, informed consent is the means by which the "patient's" autonomy rights
are to be actualized. That the doctrine accomplishes its intended purpose only
deficiently is evidenced by the attitudes of the physicians in the surveys men-
tioned above. 72 1 submit that one way to accomplish the objectives of truly in-
formed consent is to eliminate the term "patient" from the medical vocabulary.
Linguistic change per se is not a necessary or even sufficient condition for achiev-
ing this purpose. Eliminating "patient" and replacing it with a more suitable
term will serve to sensitize physicians to the issues underlying the doctrine of
informed consent and the end it is designed to achieve.
69 It should be observed, however, that there is a sense of "to suffer" meaning "to
undergo or be subjected to an action." In Plato's Crito, for instance, Socrates asks Crito
"[W]hether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our
escape...." THE WORKS OF PLATO 98 (I. Edman ed. 1956).
70 See, e.g., Lidz, supra note 65, at 543; Cross & Churchill, supra note 50, at 112.
The clearest manifestation of this is the interpretation of informed consent by the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research. According to the Commission, this principle "incorporates at least two basic
ethical convictions: First, that individuals should be treated as autonomous agents; and
second, that persons with diminished autonomy and thus in need of protection are en-
titled to such protection." THE BELMONT REPORT, supra note 12, at 4 (DHEW Pub. No.
(OS) 78-0012).
71 Stone, Informed Consent: Special Problems for Psychiatry, 30 Hosp. & COM-
MUNITY PSYCH. 321, 322 (1979).
72 Katz has persuasively argued that the doctrine of informed consent is certainly
less than solidly founded and has yet to be fully realized. See generally Katz, supra note
7, at 7-29.
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The term "client" is a fitting replacement, though it may seem odd after hav-
ing contrasted "patient" with "agent" that I urge the adoption of "client" in-
stead. I do this for two reasons. First, the term "client" is already in use by
some phychiatrists. 73 Second, it is unrealistic to expect use of the term "agent"
to gather momentum. "Agent," of course, is the preferred term, but will of
necessity remain in the halls of philosophy departments. In any event, the term
"client" does adequate justice to the values in question and is preferred over
"patient."
Here, we may take a cue from the feminist movement, which in recent years
has insisted that the term "man" (as in "chairman" and "mankind") be expung-
ed from ordinary language. Feminists have argued that "man" is indicative of
an underlying bias against sexual equality and should be replaced by terms which
are gender-neutral (e.g., "chairperson" and "humankind"). They do not sug-
gest that this change alone will accomplish a shift in attitudes or will effectively
promote sexual equality. Clearly, a woman can be chairperson of the board
and still be the subject of gross inequality (e.g., she might receive less compen-
sation than her male counterparts). Rather, feminist theoreticians have argued
that linguistic change together with social, educational, and legal reforms will
correct the power structure which has long been unbalanced.
74
The feminists' efforts have not been for naught. We are beginning to witness
the opening of doors that have long been closed to women. Concommitant with
this, we are seeing etymological changes in various disciplines. Hardly an arti-
cle is written in philosophy journals today which does not alternate, in suc-
cessive paragraphs, the use of gender pronouns. The same is true of legal jour-
nals. These linguistic changes sensitize readers to the social reforms for which
feminists have been pressing.
What we call people is vitally important, since names have a meaning beyond
their denotation. 75 It is easier to incarcerate a "parasite of the state" than it is
to jail a "conscientious objector;" it is easier to deny a "queer" employment
than it is to deny a "gay person" employment. The Nazi extermination of Jews
became easier once they had been called "vermin" sufficiently often to strip them
73 Also, it should be noted that some psychologists refer to their "patients" as "clients"
since they do not employ a medical model.
74 Telephone interview with Gertrude Ezorsky, Professor of Philosophy, City Univer-
sity of New York (Jan. 29, 1985).
71 "Denotation" is "the direct, explicit meaning or reference of a word or term,"
WEBSTERS NEW WORLD DIcTIONARY 377 (2d College ed. (1970)), while "connotation" refers
to an "idea or notion suggested by or associated with a word, phrase, etc., in addition
to its explicit meaning." Id. at 301.
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of their human-ness." In this sense it is easier to dismiss a "patient's" value
judgments than it is to dismiss a "client's" value judgments.7 7
There is also a sense in which all social reform must be accompanied by
linguistic reform. One of the developments of the civil rights movement, for
instance, was the rejection of the word "Negro" and its replacement with the
term "Black." This linguistic change accompanied the rejection of second-class
citizenship. The linguistic analog within the homosexual rights movement is
the insistence on the use of the term "gay." There is nothing intrinsically
discriminatory about "Negro" or "homosexual;" these words are different from
"chairman" in an important sense. 78 But these terms have so long had pejorative
connotations, that linguistic change has been perceived as a vital component
of social equality. It is in this sense that linguistic reform is important whenever
we are concerned with protecting and upgrading the status of a particular class
of people.
Now I think I have shown that "patient" is value-laden in a non-trivial sense,
and that it ought to be replaced in the medical vocabulary. Still, I am prepared
to defend the weaker thesis that even if such change is ultimately a matter of
semantics, it is still not merely semantics. A change in terms, together with social,
educational, and legal reforms, will further the purpose of informed consent.
Such reform might consist in lobbying for the legislative adoption of the material
risk standard. Since the early 1970's, an increasing number of courts has adoped
this particular standard though, unfortunately, in a majority of jurisdictions
(seventy-five percent) the professional custom standard is still adhered to. 79 In
medical schools, reform is already taking place with the addition of courses
on medical ethics to the curriculum; and the American Association of Medical
Colleges has called for pre-med students to be more broadly exposed to the
humanities. 80 The proliferation of hospital medical ethics committees is part
of the same trend.
By replacing the term "patient" with the term "client," I am not suggesting
that clients do not suffer or that they have no need for the advice of health
professionals. I am simply saying that linguistic reform would increase respect
for "patients' autonomy rights. It is important to choose terms carefully and
to avoid terms that imply inadequate values. In the physician/"client" relation-
ship, the physician's superior knowledge is still recognized, but the client re-
tains significant authority and responsibility in decision-making. 8' Compare this
76 Conversely, Hannah Arendt has noted that while Nazi executioners defiled Jews
prior to exterminating them, some Jewish prisoners deified their executioners to mitigate
their fate. See generally H. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: THE BANALITY OF EVIL
(1963). Katz too has noted the tendency in "patients" to deify physicians. See Katz, supra
note 7, at 100-01.
77 One need only to ponder the emotive significance of this sentence to appreciate
its force.
78 "Chairman" wears its bias on its face. "Negro," however, does not. My strong
thesis is that "patient" is more like "chairman" than like "Negro."
79 See T. BEAUCHAMP & L. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 31, at 68.
80 Medical World News, Oct. 25, 1984, at 26.
s See M. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 68 and passim (1981).
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to the attorney/client relationship. The attorney's expertise is surely acknowledg-
ed but it is the client's judgment that is ultimately binding.82
VII. CONCLUSION
Moral philosophy since Kant has been almost exclusively concerned with
"act/rule" morality. A preoccupation with the basis of ethical choice and con-
duct has dominated scholarly activity in the area. "Agent" morality, and a
thoroughgoing examination of the moral actors behind act/rule, has largely been
ignored. Most of this essay is in the tradition of the latter, emphasizing, as it
does, what it means to respect autonomous agents. These notions recall a remote
passage from an essay by William James, entitled "What Makes A Life Signifi-
cant." According to James:
Every Jack sees in his own particular Jill charms and perfections to the
enchantment of which we stolid onlookers are stone-cold. And which
has the superior view of the absolute truth, he or we7 Which has the
more vital insight into the nature of Jill's existence, as a fact7 Is he in
excess, being in this matter a maniac? or are we in defect, being vic-
tims of a pathological anaesthesia as regards Jill's magical importance7
Surely the latter; surely to Jack are the profounder truths revealed; sure-
ly poor Jill's palpitating little life-throbs are among the wonders of crea-
tion, are worthy of this sympathetic interest; and it is to our shame
that the rest of us cannot feel like Jack. 8
3
At a time when the medical division of labor significantly detracts from view-
ing persons as autonomous agents, in a world where time is in short supply
and detracts from paying too much attention to any particular "patient," it is
important to be reminded that "patients," like Jack's Jill, are people who have
intrinsic worth. They surely are not "interesting cases" or "specimens of diseas-
ed biology;" neither are they "just patients."
In 1983 Elie Weisel addressed the graduating class of Mt. Sinai Medical School.
After seeing the evil to which medicine can be put, having been a victim of
the Nazi concentration camps, Weisel told the new physicians that at one time
or another over the course of their careers, they would be confronted with a
"patient" who would demand to be treated as if he were the only person that
physician could treat; as if he were the center of the universe. And, said Weisel,
he is.
82 See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. Canon 7, EC 7-8 (1979):
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations ....
In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the
decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of
non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself.
Id.
83 James, What Makes A Life Significant, in THE WRITING OF WILLIAM JAMES 645
(J. McDermott ed. 1977).
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